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In re Estate of Bloomer'
Before enactment of Missouri Revised Statutes section 474.420,2 di-
vorce did not revoke will provisions in favor of a former spouse. The law
was harsh. It was applied even when the divorce included a final settlement
of all property rights of the testator vis-a-vis his spouse.3 Recognizing that
the effect of the common law was contrary to the intent of most testators,
the legislature in 1956 enacted section 474.420, which provides that "[i]f
after making a will the testator is divorced, all provisions in the will in favor
of the testator's spouse so divorced are thereby revoked but the effect of the
revocation shall be the same as if the divorced spouse had died at the time
of the divorce."'4 The section further provides that "[w]ith this exception,
no written will, nor any part thereof, can be revoked by any change in
circumstances or condition of the testator."5 Though few cases have been
decided under the statute,6 the Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted
1. 620 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. en banc 1981).
2. (1978).
3. See Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 833, 136 S.W.2d 278, 280 (1940);
Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REV. 82, 89 (1965).
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.420 (1978). Accord First Church of Christ, Scientist
v. Watson, 286 Ala. 270, 273, 239 So. 2d 194, 196 (1970); Steele v. Chase, 151 Ind.
App. 600, 606, 281 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1972); Russell v. Estaie of Russell, 216 Kan.
730, 733, 534 P.2d 261, 264-65 (1975); Calloway v. Gasser, 558 S.W.2d 571, 576
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (1975). But see In re Will of
Lampshire, 57 Misc. 2d 332, 334, 292 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (Sur. Ct. 1968); Davis v.
Davis, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 388, 392, 258 N.E.2d 277, 282 (C.P. 1979); Volkmer v.
Chase, 354 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); In re Estate of McLaughlin, 11
Wash. App. 320, 323, 523 P.2d 437, 438 (1974). See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d
1108 (1976).
5. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.420 (1978).
6. See In re Estate of Bloomer, 620 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. en banc 1981) (provisions
in will executed prior to marriage of testator are subject to revocation); Rookstool v.
Neaf, 377 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1964) (will executed and divorce granted prior to enact-
ment; provisions favoring former spouse were revoked); Crist v. Nesbit, 352 S.W.2d
53 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961) (statute does not apply in situations where no divorce
granted). The section was also considered in In re Estate of Bloomer, 528 S.W.2d
784 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975), where the court held that issues concerning § 474.420
are properly raised at the distribution hearing rather than during the will contest
proceeding. Id at 786-87. This holding is probably based on McCarthy v. Fidelity
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 325 Mo. 727, 735, 30 S.W.2d 19, 21 (1930), in which the
court held that under Mo. REV. STAT. § 525 (1919) (current version at id
§ 473.083 (Supp. 1982)), a will must fall as a whole. Only the validity of the will as
a testamentary document, not the validity of an individual devise, is at issue in a
1
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this language as unambiguous and has therefore found no reason to ex-
amine either the legislative intent behind the statute or its practical effect.7
The most recent decision involving section 474.420, In re Estate of Bloomer,8 is
the first to directly construe its scope and illustrates the weakness of this
approach. This Note will examine the holding in Bloomer and its signifi-
cance for issues arising under this statute in the future.
The testator, Joseph Bloomer, executed a will in 1952, leaving his en-
tire estate to Ruth Hays.9 Joseph and Ruth were married shortly thereaf-
ter. Five months later they entered into a property settlement, and they
were divorced in 1954. Following Joseph's death in 1969, Ruth was ap-
pointed administratrix of his estate, the will was admitted to probate, and
letters testamentary were issued."o In the subsequent proceeding for settle-
ment and distribution of the estate, the trial court approved the final settle-
ment and proposed order of distribution, which recognized Ruth as the sole
beneficiary under the will. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District affirmed, but the case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme
Court to be heard as an original appeal."
The supreme court was faced with the question whether section
474.420, which became effective after the divorce, should apply to revoke
the provisions favoring Ruth. While stipulating to the facts, Ruth argued
that the section did not apply to her because Joseph executed the will prior
will contest proceeding. 325 Mo. at 733, 30 S.W.2d at 22. It should be noted,
however, that Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.081 (Supp. 1982), which became effective af-
ter the case was decided, clearly indicates that part of a will may be admitted to
probate while another part is denied probate. This statutory amendment gives
force to the argument that partial revocation ought to be raised in the will contest
proceeding. If this is, in fact, the statute's effect, the issue of partial revocation
would have to be raised within six months after the first publication of notice of
letters testamentary under id § 473.033 or it is precluded.
7. In Rookstool v. Neaf, 377 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1964), the leading case on
§ 474.420, the court dismissed a claim that the statute should not apply retroac-
tively without discussing the meaning of the statute or the purpose of the legisla-
ture. Id at 409 (citing In re Ziegner's Estate, 146 Wash. 537, 264 P. 12 (1928)).
8. 620 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. en banc 1981).
9. Id at 366.
10. In re Estate of Bloomer, 528 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975). In a
petition for removal, Joseph's heirs alleged that Ruth was not legally entitled to act
as administratrix of the estate. They charged that she had wrongfully procured the
appointment by stating that she was the sole beneficiary under the will when actu-
ally she had no interest under the will because of her divorce. The petition was
denied by the Adair County Circuit Court, and that decision was affirmed on ap-
peal. Id In an action for removal, the issues are limited to the representative's
right to sue as administratrix of the estate. The court stated that a finding that the
administratrix had no interest as a beneficiary went beyond the issues presented by
the petition. Id at 786-87. See generalf Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 876 (1954) (effect of
divorce on former spouse's right to administer estate).
11. The transfer was made under Mo. CONST. art. V, § 9 (1976).
1983]
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to the marriage.' Examining the "straight-forward words of the statute,"
the court, in a 4-3 decision, rejected Ruth's contention and held that all
provisions favoring her were revoked by operation of law.'" While the
court's decision is sound, the majority's approach to the interpretation of
section 474.420 may prove inadequate in analyzing questions that arise in
the future.
To evaluate the decision, it is necessary to examine the background of
the statute. Section 474.420 is a deviation from the common law which,
because there were few divorces in early England, did not provide for revo-
cation of will provisions upon the divorce of the testator. 14 The doctrine
that divorce operates to revoke a will has been largely a development of
American law. A number of jurisdictions, by statute or decision, provide
that divorce revokes a will in whole or part. 5 The rationale generally as-
12. 620 S.W.2d at 367. Ruth argued for a distinction between wills executed
before marriage, like Joseph's, and those executed during marriage.
13. Id at 366. The court noted that the statute operated to impose "construc-
tive death" on Ruth with regard to the will provisions in her favor. 'Id at 367. The
Bloomer anti-lapse statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.460 (Supp. 1982), which is limited
to devises to relatives, did not prevent the lapse of the devise because a spouse is not
a "relative" under that section. 620 S.W.2d at 367.
14. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 431 (2d ed. 1953).
15. Even in the absence of a statute explicitly providing for revocation, the
majority rule is that provisions in a previously executed will are revoked by a di-
vorce coupled with a property settlement. See, e.g., Capriotti v. Millsaps, 123 Ariz.
App. 281, 285, 599 P.2d 237, 241 (1979); Caswell v. Kent, 158 Me. 493, 495, 186
A.2d 581, 582 (1962); Donaldson v. Hall, 106 Minn. 502, 509, 119 N.W. 219, 221
(1909); In re Estate of Bartlett, 108 Neb. 691, 692, 190 N.W. 869, 869 (1922); Youn-
ker v. Johnson, 160 Ohio St. 409, 411-12, 116 N.E.2d 715, 717 (1954). The minority
rule is that will provisions in favor of a former spouse are not revoked by a divorce,
even when accompanied by a property settlement. See, e.g., Card v. Alexander, 48
Conn. 492, 504 (1881); In re Estate of Mercure, 391 Mich. 442, 453, 216 N.W.2d
914, 919 (1974); In re Blanchard's Estate, 391 Mich. 644, 651-52, 218 N.W.2d 37, 40
(1974).
A number of states have statutes providing for revocation by divorce. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 43-1-8 (1975), construed in Jeffries v. Boyd, 269 Ala. 177, 179, 112 So.
2d 210, 211 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-407 (Supp. 1982), construed in Mosely v.
Mosely, 217 Ark. 536, 538, 231 S.W.2d 99, 100 (1950); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732,507
(West 1975), construed in Bauer v. Reese, 161 So. 2d 678, 679-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-8 (Burns 1972), construed in Steele v. Chase, 151
Ind. App. 600, 605, 281 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1960); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§ 4-105 (1974), construed in Webster v. Larmore, 268 Md. 153, 169, 299 A.2d 814,
822 (1973); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.420 (1978), construed in Crist v. Nesbit, 352
S.W.2d 53, 57 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4
(McKinney 1981), construed in In re Estate of Lampshire, 57 Misc. 2d 332, 333, 292
N.Y.S.2d 578, 579 (Sur. Ct. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.4 (Supp. 1979), construed
in Ivery v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 724, 129 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1963); TEx. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 69 (Vernon 1980), construed in Grudziecki v. Starr, 351 S.W.2d 381, 382
[Vol. 48
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serted is that revoking provisions in favor of the former spouse implements
the probable intent of the testator by operation of law without requiring
him to go to the time and expense of making a new will.' 6 Before the enact-
ment of section 474.420, Missouri followed the common law. 17 Statutory
revocation could be effected only in certain specific situations' 8 and the
courts refused to adopt an implied revocation doctrine concerning di-
vorce.' 9 Consequently, divorce-whether or not accompanied by a prop-
erty settlement-did not revoke a will in Missouri.2 ° Section 474.420
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962); VA. CODE § 64.1-59 (1950), construed in Papen v. Papen, 216
Va. 879, 880, 224 S.E.2d 153, 153 (1976). See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 1297
(1976) (divorce or annulment as affecting will).
Treatment of the disposition of the revoked devise differs in different jurisdic-
tions. The Uniform Probate Code revokes only those provisions in favor of the
former spouse. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (1975). The Missouri statute is in
accord. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.420 (1978). See also ALA. CODE § 43-1-8 (1975);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-407 (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-8 (Burns 1972);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-5.4 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.315 (1981). Some statutes have been
interpreted as revoking the entire will, not merely the provisions in favor of the
former spouse. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.507 (West 1975), construed in Bauer v.
Reese, 161 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-76
(1981), construed in Friedman v. Cohen, 215 Ga. 859, 860, 114 S.E.2d 24, 26 (1960).
See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 1297 (1976).
16. The court in Caswell v. Kent, 158 Me. 493, 186 A.2d 581 (1962), repeated
the often-cited proposition:
[I]t is so rare and so unusual for a testator under these circumstances [di-
vorce and division of property] to desire or intend that his divorced spouse
should benefit further under his will, that it is not improper or unreasona-
ble to require that such a testator make that extraordinary desire and in-
tention manifest by a formal republication of his will or by the execution
of a new will.
Id at 496, 186 A.2d at 582-83. See also Luff v. Luff, 359 F.2d 235, 238 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 544, 52 P.2d 1219, 1222 (1935).
17. See Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 833, 136 S.W.2d 278, 280 (1940).
18. For example, until the enactment of Mo. REv. STAT. § 645 (1929), mar-
riage revoked a woman's will. With the enactment of § 645, however, wills of both
sexes were revoked by subsequent marriage and birth of issue who survived the
testator's death. See Summers, The Proposed Probate Code for Missouri, 20 Mo. L. REV.
123, 138 (1955).
19. Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 833, 136 S.W.2d 278, 280 (1940). "In our
opinion the statutes have abrogated this common-law doctrine of implied revoca-
tion and are exclusive." Id at 831, 136 S.W.2d at 279. Accord In re Estate of
Comassi, 197 Cal. 1, 5, 40 P. 15, 16 (1895); Jones' Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 372, 60 A.
915, 918 (1905); In re Darrow's Estate, 164 Pa. Super. 25, 31, 63 A.2d 458, 460
(1949). Contra Luff v. Luff, 359 F.2d 235, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Sheldon v. Sheldon,
66 N.J. Super. 590, 595, 169 A.2d 722, 725 (1961); Rankin v. McDearmon, 38 Tenn.
App. 160, 167, 270 S.W.2d 660, 663 (1953).
20. Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 833, 136 S.W.2d 278, 280 (1940).
1983]
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completely changed the law.
The Bloomer decision turned on the interpretation of that section, so the
court had to utilize the principles of statutory construction. Although there
are variations, a statute generally will be construed in one of two ways:
strictly or liberally.2 ' The strict, or "plain meaning" approach, used by the
majority in Bloomer, 2 focuses exclusively on the words of a statute to ascer-
tain its meaning.23 In essence, the legislature is deemed to have meant ex-
actly what the statute says. Only if the words are ambiguous will the
legislature's purpose be examined.2 4 Although this approach facilitates uni-
form application, it fails to recognize that words are imperfect and do not
always convey the legislature's meaning.25 More significantly, words that
convey the intent of the legislature in one application may fail to do so in
another.
Bloomer illustrates the weakness of this approach. First, although it was
not an issue in the case, the court continued to apply section 474.420 retro-
21. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.02
(4th ed. 1973).
22. 620 S.W.2d at 367.
23. The rule is based on the principle that if the language of a provision is
plain, the sole function of the courts is to apply the statute as written. Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S.
662, 670-71 (1888)); United States v. Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 258 (1913); United States
v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1913); Bate Refrigerating
Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33 (1894). Where the language is plain and admits of
no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules
which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.
24. The court in Bloomer stated the position succinctly:
When the language of a statute is unambiguous and conveys a plain and
definite meaning, the courts have no business to look for or to impose
another meaning . . . . If a statute is unambiguous, a court should re-
gard it as meaning what it says since the legislature is presumed to have
intended exactly what it states directly.
620 S.W.2d at 367 (quoting State ex rel. Collins v. Donelson, 557 S.W.2d 707, 710
(Mo. App., K.C. 1977); Pedroli v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 524 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1975)).
25. Professor Dickerson argues that relying on the literal interpretation of
words, without examination of other factors, is "simple nonsense; to exclude consid-
eration of context would be to ignore one of the basic principles of communica-
tion." R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 230
(1975). This approach "has sometimes been used to read ineptly expressed lan-
guage out of its proper context, in violation of established principles of meaning and
communication."Id at 229. A better approach, he believes, is that taken in Hutton
v. Phillips, 45 Del. 156, 160, 70 A.2d 15, 17 (1949), where the court considered that
the plain meaning rule meant "little more than that we are convinced that virtually
anyone competent to understand it . . . would attribute to the expression in its
context a meaning such as the one we derive,. . . and would consider any differ-
ent meaning, by comparison, strained, or far-fetched, or unusual, or unlikely."
[Vol. 48
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actively to divorces granted before its enactment.26 This application forces
a testator to attempt to predict the substance and effect of a statutory
change and may even subject the testator's attorney to potential liability for
failure to notify his client of pertinent changes in the law.27 At the time of
the Bloomers' divorce, Missouri law was clear. A divorce accompanied by a
property settlement did not revoke a will. 28 By allowing the date of death,
rather than the date of divorce, to determine the applicability of the statute,
the court in essence rewrote the testator's will. Even though the plain words
of the statute direct this result, it is questionable whether this effect was
even considered by the drafters.
Second, although the result reached in Bloomer was correct on its facts,
the underlying reasoning is not sound. At issue in the case was whether a
will executed before marriage fell within the scope of section 474.420.
Based on a strict reading of the statute, the court held that it applied and
that the devise was revoked. 29 The court found that "the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous and, therefore, requires no construction,
liberal or otherwise."3 The problem with this approach is that a court may
fail to consider words in the context in which they were enacted and thus
26. The retroactive effect of § 474.420 was briefly discussed in Rookstool v.
Neaft, 377 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Mo. 1964). In holding that the statute applied to di-
vorces granted prior to enactment of the statute, the court reasoned that since wills
are ambulatory, the provisions only come into effect upon the death of the testator.
Id (citing Humphreys v. Welling, 341 Mo. 1198, 1208, 11 S.W.2d 123, 128 (1937);
Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo. 483, 488, 291 S.W. 132, 134 (1927)). Accord Papen v.
Papen, 216 Va. 879, 882, 224 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1976).
27. The American Bar Association has indicated that there may be a duty to
keep a client apprised of changes in the law that may affect his interests:
Many events transpire between the date of making the will and the death
of the testator. The legal significance of such occurrences are often of seri-
ous consequence, of which the testator may not be aware, and so the im-
portance of calling the attention of the testator thereto is manifest.
It is our opinion that where the lawyer has no reason to believe that
he has been supplanted by another lawyer, it is not only his right, but it
might even be his duty to advise his client of any change offact or law which might
defeat the client's testamentary purpose as expressed in the will.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 210 (1941) (empha-
sis added). Cf Bancroft v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 49, 53 (W.D. La. 1962)
(accountant's insurer liable for additional taxes paid when clients relied on written
opinion and accountant failed to notify clients of changes in law).
28. Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 828, 833, 136 S.W.2d 278, 280 (1940).
29. 620 S.W.2d at 367.
30. Id In dictum, the court noted that a divorced individual does not usually
desire a bequest to a former spouse to remain in effect and that the statute was
enacted to accomplish the desired outcome in most instances. Id. at 366. But the
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arrive at undesirable results in particular cases.31
A better method of statutory interpretation is to look beyond the words
of the statute to find its true meaning. This "liberal" method of interpreta-
tion32 analyzes both the legislative purpose and the actual words of a stat-
ute.3 3 When the specific purpose of the legislature is not clearly evident,
courts often ask four questions in an attempt to discover it: (1) What was
the law before the statute? (2) What were the shortcomings of the prior law?
(3) Why did the legislature enact a new statute? (4) What was the remedy
chosen? 34 This approach, known as the "mischief rule," determines legisla-
tive purpose by comparing the old law to the new.
The Bloomer court could have reached the same result if it had ex-
amined section 474.420 under this analytical framework. Before the enact-
ment of the statute, divorce did not revoke a testator's will even when there
was a full property settlement between the parties. The law's shortcomings
31. See note 25 supra.
32. "[A] liberal construction is ordinarily one which makes a statute apply to
more things or in more situations than would be the case under strict construction."
2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 21, § 58.02.
33. The dissent in Bloomer would have liberally construed the statute and
would have held for Ruth because the will was executed prior to the marriage. 620
S.W.2d at 369 (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Donnelly believed that a
"reasonable construction of § 474.420 is that it is intended to apply only to the
revocation of a will made during a marriage." Id (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting). The
dissent quoted from an Ohio decision with similar facts:
Had the testator died before the marriage contemplated, the right of
the plaintiff to the bequest can not be doubted, for the marriage was not a
condition precedent to the legacy. Nor is the case different if, after mar-
riage, she ceases to be his wife, for the legacy is not conditioned upon her
survivorship as his widow. If, then, her right to the legacy does not de-
pend upon the marriage, it can not be lost by the divorce, for she can lose no
more by the divorce than she gained by the mamiage.
Id (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298, 304
(1875)) (emphasis added). The dissent reasoned that the statute merely "restored
the status quo of being single persons enjoyed by the parties at the time the will was
made"-at which point Ruth was the beneficiary. Id (Donnelly, Cj., dissenting).
This reasoning may have misread the legislature's purpose, since upon divorce a
testator is as likely to intend revocation of a will executed in contemplation of mar-
riage as one executed during marriage. The dissent never explained what it consid-
ered the legislature's purpose to be; it fell back on "plain meaning" language. "Had
the legislature intended that a will, made at any time prior to the testator being
divorced, would be revoked by a divorce, it could have said so." Id (Donnelly, C.J.,
dissenting). A possible response is that if the legislature had meant that only wills
made during marriage should be revoked by divorce, it could have said so.
34. This approach was formulated by Lord Coke in Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep.
72, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584), and is now the principal modern approach to deter-
mining legislative purpose. C. NUTTING & S. ELLIOTT, CASES & MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 289 (3d ed. 1964).
[Vol. 48
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were obvious; it often caused a result contrary to the stated intent of the
testator. The case law is exemplified by the 1940 decision in Robertson v.
Jones,35 in which the testator had married, executed a will, and then been
divorced. The divorce was accompanied by a property settlement which
provided that the testator's wife, in consideration of a substantial cash pay-
ment, would release all her rights in the testator's property.3 6 The testator
died six weeks later, without having revoked his will. The court allowed the
wife to take under the will even though it recognized that the testator
would not have intended that result.3 7 The court reasoned that revocations
by implication were not recognized in Missouri, and there was no statute to
prevent the wife from taking under the will."
The court recognized the harshness of the rule but indicated that
change would have to come from the legislature. 39 The legislature re-
sponded with section 474.420.40 The provision directs revocation of the will
by operation of law whenever a testator has been divorced. Significantly, it
implies that the revocation is the result of a change in the testator's circum-
stances.4' The concern of the drafters appears to have been the change in
the testator's sentiment toward the object of his devise that would accom-
pany a divorce. Thus, section 474.420 implements by operation of law that
which a testator probably would do given the time, money, and
forethought.
An examination of the old and new law indicates that the legislature's
purpose was to revoke will provisions in the event of divorce, which in most
cases would coincide with the sentiments of the testator.42 Examining the
issue presented in Bloomer in light of this purpose, it is evident that the will
provisions in Ruth's favor should have been revoked regardless of when the
will was executed. The court, however, by looking only at the words of the
statute, risks extending the decisional law beyond the limits envisioned by
the legislature. The problems of this approach can be seen in an examina-
tion of just two questions that may arise under section 474.420: (1) whether
remarriage to the same spouse constitutes revival of the original will, and
(2) what effect an annulment will have on a previously executed will.
Section 474.420 does not provide for the possibility that the testator
35. 345 Mo. 828, 136 S.W.2d 278 (1940).
36. Id at 830, 136 S.W.2d at 278.
37. Id
38. Id at 832, 136 S.W.2d at 280.
39. Id at 828, 136 S.W.2d at 278.
40. Section 474.420 was adapted from MODEL PROBATE CODE § 53 (1946).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.420 comment (1978). The Missouri statute was amended,
however, to include a direction for the disposition of the revoked spousal provisions.
41. The statute provides that except for divorce, "no written will. . . can be
revoked by any change in the circumstances or conditions of the testator." Id § 474.420
(emphasis added).
42. This is the interpretation offered by the court in Bloomer. 620 S.W.2d at
1983]
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and his former spouse will marry each other a second time.4 3 Conse-
quently, it is unclear how the court would treat this issue.44 An indiscrimi-
nate application of the "plain and unambiguous" statute would
automatically revoke provisions in favor of the spouse regardless of the fact
that the parties had remarried before the testator's death. This would not
only defeat the probable intent of the testator but may also be outside the
scope of the statute as intended by the legislature.4 5 In such a situation, the
court would either have to retreat from the literal reading adopted in
Bloomer or strictly adhere to the plain meaning rule, which would produce a
result that neither the testator nor the legislature probably intended.
The section also does not provide for revocation of will provisions in
the event of an annulment of the marriage.46 The intent of the testator is
probably the same whether the marriage is dissolved by divorce or annul-
ment, and it is difficult to see why the legislature, if it considered the issue,
would revoke the will in one case but not in the other. It is possible that a
Missouri court, as a rule of construction, could carry out the statute's appar-
ent purpose and treat an annulment as a divorce,4 7 but a strict reading of
the language might cause the court to hold that an annulment does not
revoke will provisions in favor of the former spouse.
There are benefits in the court's approach in Bloomer. It helps ensure
predictability in interpreting the gaps in section 474.420. A testator who is
divorced is on notice that unless he affirmatively revives the instrument, a
will executed in favor of a former spouse will be revoked upon his death by
43. The reason for this omission is unclear. It is possible that the provision was
not considered by the legislature. Section 474.420 was adopted from MODEL PRO-
BATE CODE § 53 (1946), which did not provide for this eventuality, and both were
promulgated prior to the Uniform Probate Code, which provides that a devise re-
voked solely by reason of divorce is revived by the testator's remarriage to the for-
mer spouse. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (1975).
44. In In re Estate of Guess, 213 So. 2d 638, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), the
court held that remarriage does not revive provisions that were revoked by a prior
divorce. Cf Bauer v. Reese, 161 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (will
revocation by divorce does not limit wife's intestate interest after remarriage to
testator).
45. If, as the Bloomer court recognized, the legislature "wrote the statute to ac-
complish what was perceived to be the desired outcome in most divorces," 620
S.W.2d at 366, a holding that the revoked will was not revived-which would not be
the desired outcome in most cases of remarriage-would be at variance with the
legislative purpose.
46. As with omission of the remarriage question, see note 43 supra, the reason
for this is unclear. The Uniform Probate Code provides for this contingency and
revokes will provisons in favor of the putative or former spouse on either annulment
or divorce. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (1975).
47. In Ivery v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 129 S.E.2d 456 (1963), a statute, similar to
§ 474.420, was also silent as to whether an annulment revoked a will. The court
held that the term "divorce" included annulment. Id at 725, 129 S.E.2d at 460.
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operation of law. But the decision is disturbing because the court indicates
that the statute may be indiscriminately applied regardless of legislative
purpose and practical effect. To the extent that the court must shift its
approach to accommodate new issues that arise, it may lose the advantage
of predictability. To the extent that it refuses to accommodate the prob-
able intent of both the testator and the legislature, it may reach results that
are difficult to justify. Balancing these two alternatives is difficult, and the
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